EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Secure verification of location claims
WiSe '03 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Wireless security
The sybil attack in sensor networks: analysis & defenses
Proceedings of the 3rd international symposium on Information processing in sensor networks
Modeling vulnerabilities of ad hoc routing protocols
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
SECTOR: secure tracking of node encounters in multi-hop wireless networks
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
Distributed Detection of Node Replication Attacks in Sensor Networks
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A modular correctness proof of IEEE 802.11i and TLS
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
An RFID Distance Bounding Protocol
SECURECOMM '05 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks
Provably Secure On-Demand Source Routing in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
A framework for security analysis of mobile wireless networks
Theoretical Computer Science - Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis
Detecting relay attacks with timing-based protocols
ASIACCS '07 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Proceedings of the 8th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
TrueLink: A Practical Countermeasure to the Wormhole Attack in Wireless Networks
ICNP '06 Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
Security of emergent properties in ad-hoc networks (transcript of discussion)
SP'04 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Security Protocols
Secure neighborhood discovery: a fundamental element for mobile ad hoc networking
IEEE Communications Magazine
Secure positioning in wireless networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Towards provable secure neighbor discovery in wireless networks
Proceedings of the 6th ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
A practical secure neighbor verification protocol for wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the second ACM conference on Wireless network security
Wormhole-resilient secure neighbor discovery in underwater acoustic networks
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
SeCA: A framework for Secure Channel Assignment in wireless mesh networks
Computer Communications
Formal Reasoning about Physical Properties of Security Protocols
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
MSN: mutual secure neighbor verification in multi-hop wireless networks
Security and Communication Networks
Secure Neighborhood Creation in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks using Hop Count Discrepancies
Mobile Networks and Applications
CTAC: Control traffic tunneling attacks' countermeasures in mobile wireless networks
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
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Wireless communication enables a broad spectrum of applications, ranging from commodity to tactical systems. Neighbor discovery (ND), that is, determining which devices are within direct radio communication, is a building block of network protocols and applications, and its vulnerability can severely compromise their functionalities. A number of proposals to secure ND have been published, but none have analyzed the problem formally. In this paper, we contribute such an analysis: We build a formal model capturing salient characteristics of wireless systems, most notably obstacles and interference, and we provide a specification of a basic variant of the ND problem. Then, we derive an impossibility result for a general class of protocols we term "time-based protocols," to which many of the schemes in the literature belong. We also identify the conditions under which the impossibility result is lifted. Moreover, we explore a second class of protocols we term "time- and location-based protocols," and prove they can secure ND.