STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Private Searching on Streaming Data
Journal of Cryptology
Public-key cryptosystems based on composite degree residuosity classes
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Indexing information for data forensics
ACNS'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Privacy-preserving set operations
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
On private scalar product computation for privacy-preserving data mining
ICISC'04 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
Combinatorial pair testing: distinguishing workers from slackers
WADS'13 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Algorithms and Data Structures
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Combinatorial group testing, given a set C of individuals ("customers"), consists of applying group tests on subsets of C for the purpose of identifying which members of C are infected (or, more generally, defective in some way). The outcome of a group test reveals only the presence or absence of infection(s) in that group, but a number of group tests exactly identifies all infected members. Although the main motivation for group testing is economic - it drastically cuts down the number of necessary tests - it has an interesting privacy side-effect, namely, that each individual customer is "hiding in a crowd" (the groups within which it is being tested). This privacy side-effect is currently thrown away because the analysis that pinpoints who is infected is carried out by the same entity that prepared the test samples. This paper gives a protocol in which these two duties are separated between Alice and Bob: The protocol informs each customer who is infected privately, and without either Alice or Bob learning who is infected. An interesting feature of our protocol is that a customer need not have any computational power, i.e., the customer can be notified by mailing her (possibly paper copies of) two random strings - one from Alice and one from Bob - so all she has to do is visually check whether these two strings are equal or not.