Journal of Computer and System Sciences - 26th IEEE Conference on Foundations of Computer Science, October 21-23, 1985
Parallel and distributed computation: numerical methods
Parallel and distributed computation: numerical methods
Optimization flow control—I: basic algorithm and convergence
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Market Equilibrium via a Primal-Dual-Type Algorithm
FOCS '02 Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Auction algorithms for market equilibrium
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Market equilibrium via the excess demand function
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Sink Equilibria and Convergence
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Fast convergence to Wardrop equilibria by adaptive sampling methods
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The communication complexity of uncoupled nash equilibrium procedures
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Convergence to approximate Nash equilibria in congestion games
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Proportional Response Dynamics in the Fisher Market
ICALP '09 Proceedings of the 36th Internatilonal Collogquium on Automata, Languages and Programming: Part II
Algorithmic Game Theory: A Snapshot
ICALP '09 Proceedings of the 36th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming: Part I
Computational Aspects of Equilibria
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Market communication in production economies
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Market equilibrium with transaction costs
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Proportional response dynamics in the Fisher market
Theoretical Computer Science
Distributed algorithms via gradient descent for fisher markets
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Tatonnement in ongoing markets of complementary goods
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
A dynamic axiomatic approach to first-price auctions
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Tatonnement beyond gross substitutes?: gradient descent to the rescue
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Why might markets tend toward and remain near equilibrium prices? In an effort to shed light on this question from an algorithmic perspective, this paper formalizes the setting of Ongoing Markets, by contrast with the classic market scenario, which we term One-Time Markets. The Ongoing Market allows trade at non-equilibrium prices, and, as its name suggests, continues over time. As such, it appears to be a more plausible model of actual markets. For both market settings, this paper defines and analyzes variants of a simple tatonnement algorithm that differs from previous algorithms that have been subject to asymptotic analysis in three significant respects: the price update for a good depends only on the price, demand, and supply for that good, and on no other information; the price update for each good occurs distributively and asynchronously; the algorithms work (and the analyses hold) from an arbitrary starting point. Our algorithm introduces a new and natural update rule. We show that this update rule leads to fast convergence toward equilibrium prices in a broad class of markets that satisfy the weak gross substitutes property. These are the first analyses for computationally and informationally distributed algorithms that demonstrate polynomial convergence. Our analysis identifies three parameters characterizing the markets, which govern the rate of convergence of our protocols. These parameters are, broadly speaking: 1. A bound on the fractional rate of change of demand for each good with respect to fractional changes in its price. 2. A bound on the fractional rate of change of demand for each good with respect to fractional changes in wealth. 3. The closeness of the market to a Fisher market (a market with buyers starting with money alone). We give two types of protocols. The first type assumes global knowledge of only (an upper bound on) the first parameter. For this protocol, we also provide a matching lower bound in terms of these parameters for the One-Time Market. Our second protocol, which is analyzed for the One-Time Market alone, assumes no global knowledge whatsoever.