Auction algorithms for market equilibrium
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A path to the Arrow–Debreu competitive market equilibrium
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
Algorithmic Game Theory
Fast-converging tatonnement algorithms for one-time and ongoing market problems
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Optimal envy-free pricing with metric substitutability
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Price roll-backs and path auctions: an approximation scheme for computing the market equilibrium
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Computing equilibrium prices in exchange economies with tax distortions
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
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Identical products being sold at different prices in different locations is a common phenomenon. To model such scenarios, we supplement the classical Fisher market model by introducing transaction costs. For every buyer i and good j, there is a transaction cost of cij ; if the price of good j is pj, then the cost to the buyer i per unit of j is pj + cij. The same good can thus be sold at different (effective) prices to different buyers. We provide a combinatorial algorithm that computes ε-approximate equilibrium prices and allocations in O(1/ε (n + logm)mnlog(B/ε)) operations - where m is the number goods, n is the number of buyers and B is the sum of the budgets of all the buyers.