Cryptanalysis of the RCES/RSES image encryption scheme

  • Authors:

  • Shujun Li;Chengqing Li;Guanrong Chen;Kwok-Tung Lo

  • Affiliations:

  • FernUniversität in Hagen, Lehrgebiet Informationstechnik, Universitätsstraíe 27, 58084 Hagen, Germany;Department of Electronic Engineering, City University of Hong Kong, 83 Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong SAR, China;Department of Electronic Engineering, City University of Hong Kong, 83 Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong SAR, China;Department of Electronic and Information Engineering, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Hom, Kowloon, Hong Kong SAR, China

  • Venue:
  • Journal of Systems and Software
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

Recently, a chaos-based image encryption scheme called RCES (also called RSES) was proposed. This paper analyses the security of RCES, and points out that it is insecure against the known/chosen-plaintext attacks: the number of required known/chosen plain-images is only one or two to succeed an attack. In addition, the security of RCES against the brute-force attack was overestimated. Both theoretical and experimental analyses are given to show the performance of the suggested known/chosen-plaintext attacks. The insecurity of RCES is due to its special design, which makes it a typical example of insecure image encryption schemes. A number of lessons are drawn from the reported cryptanalysis of RCES, consequently suggesting some common principles for ensuring a high level of security of an image encryption scheme.