On the security defects of an image encryption scheme

  • Authors:

  • Chengqing Li;Shujun Li;Muhammad Asim;Juana Nunez;Gonzalo Alvarez;Guanrong Chen

  • Affiliations:

  • Department of Electronic Engineering, City University of Hong Kong, 83 Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong SAR, China and Department of Electronic and Information Engineering, The Hong Kong P ...;Fachbereich Informatik und Informationswissenschaft, Universität Konstanz, Universitätsstraíe 10, 78457 Konstanz, Germany;Universiti Teknologi PETRONAS, 31750 Tronoh, Perak, Malaysia;Instituto de Física Aplicada, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Serrano 144, 28006 Madrid, Spain;Instituto de Física Aplicada, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Serrano 144, 28006 Madrid, Spain;Department of Electronic Engineering, City University of Hong Kong, 83 Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong SAR, China

  • Venue:
  • Image and Vision Computing
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

This paper studies the security of a recently-proposed chaos-based image encryption scheme and points out the following problems: (1) there exist a number of invalid keys and weak keys, and some keys are partially equivalent for encryption/decryption; (2) given one chosen plain-image, a subkey K"1"0 can be guessed with a smaller computational complexity than that of the simple brute-force attack; (3) given at most 128 chosen plain-images, a chosen-plaintext attack can possibly break the following part of the secret key: K"imod128"i"="4^1^0, which works very well when K"1"0 is not too large; (4) when K"1"0 is relatively small, a known-plaintext attack can be carried out with only one known plain-image to recover some visual information of any other plain-images encrypted by the same key.