Processor Control Flow Monitoring Using Signatured Instruction Streams
IEEE Transactions on Computers
CCured: type-safe retrofitting of legacy code
POPL '02 Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
CSSV: towards a realistic tool for statically detecting all buffer overflows in C
PLDI '03 Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN 2003 conference on Programming language design and implementation
Security in embedded systems: Design challenges
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems (TECS)
Beyond Stack Smashing: Recent Advances in Exploiting Buffer Overruns
IEEE Security and Privacy
Secure Embedded Processing through Hardware-Assisted Run-Time Monitoring
Proceedings of the conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe - Volume 1
Hardware support for code integrity in embedded processors
Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Compilers, architectures and synthesis for embedded systems
IMPRES: integrated monitoring for processor reliability and security
Proceedings of the 43rd annual Design Automation Conference
High coverage detection of input-related security facults
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
StackGuard: automatic adaptive detection and prevention of buffer-overflow attacks
SSYM'98 Proceedings of the 7th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 7
Design methodology for pipelined heterogeneous multiprocessor system
Proceedings of the 44th annual Design Automation Conference
Ensuring secure program execution in multiprocessor embedded systems: a case study
CODES+ISSS '07 Proceedings of the 5th IEEE/ACM international conference on Hardware/software codesign and system synthesis
LOCS: a low overhead profiler-driven design flow for security of MPSoCs
CODES+ISSS '08 Proceedings of the 6th IEEE/ACM/IFIP international conference on Hardware/Software codesign and system synthesis
Hierarchical multi-agent protection system for NoC based MPSoCs
Proceedings of the International Workshop on Security and Dependability for Resource Constrained Embedded Systems
PoliMakE: a policy making engine for secure embedded software execution on chip-multiprocessors
WESS '10 Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Embedded Systems Security
Enhancing network-on-chip components to support security of processing elements
WESS '10 Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Embedded Systems Security
CUFFS: an instruction count based architectural framework for security of MPSoCs
Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
Optimization of secure embedded systems with dynamic task sets
Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
Energy-aware design of secure multi-mode real-time embedded systems with FPGA co-processors
Proceedings of the 21st International conference on Real-Time Networks and Systems
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Security of MPSoCs is an emerging area of concern in embedded systems. Security is jeopardized by code injection attacks, which are the most common types of software attacks. Previous attempts to detect code injection in MPSoCs have been burdened with significant performance overheads. In this work, we present a hardware/software methodology "SHIELD" to detect code injection attacks in MPSoCs. SHIELD instruments the software programs running on application processors in the MPSoC and also extracts control flow and basic block execution time information for runtime checking. We employ a dedicated security processor (monitor processor) to supervise the application processors on the MPSoC. Custom hardware is designed and used in the monitor and application processors. The monitor processor uses the custom hardware to rapidly analyze information communicated to it from the application processors at runtime. We have implemented SHIELD on a commercial extensible processor (Xtensa LX2) and tested it on a multiprocessor JPEG encoder program. In addition to code injection attacks, the system is also able to detect 83% of bit flips errors in the control flow instructions. The experiments show that SHIELD produces systems with runtime which is at least 9 times faster than the previous solution. SHIELD incurs a runtime (clock cycles) performance overhead of only 6.6% and an area overhead of 26.9%, when compared to a non-secure system.