Data networks (2nd ed.)
DOMINO: a system to detect greedy behavior in IEEE 802.11 hotspots
Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Mobile systems, applications, and services
Slotted Aloha as a game with partial information
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Price-based rate control in random access networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
On the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in ALOHA games with group of selfish users
ICOIN'09 Proceedings of the 23rd international conference on Information Networking
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We study the influence of transmission costs on the behavior of selfish nodes in wireless local area networks. Intuitively, it seems that transmission costs should have a stabilizing effect as (rational) nodes will defer packet transmissions when congestion develops and the cost for (successfully) transmitting a packet becomes high. In this paper we investigate whether this intuition is true. We use the slotted Aloha to model the communication channel where we capture the interaction among nodes as a non-cooperative game. For this game, we study the existence and properties of a (symmetric) Nash equilibrium. We show that the existence of a transmission cost is not always sufficient to guarantee stability. In particular, a stable equilibrium strategy will not exist if the transmission cost is too small. We then propose and analyze a price-based mechanism to guarantee stability and to optimize system performance in terms of throughput and delay.