Handling interdependent values in an auction mechanism for bandwidth allocation in tactical data networks

Authors:
Mark Klein;Gabriel A. Moreno;David C. Parkes;Daniel Plakosh;Sven Seuken;Kurt Wallnau
Affiliations:
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA;Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA;Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA;Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA;Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA;Harvard University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Venue:
Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Economics of networked systems
Year:
2008

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Abstract

We consider a tactical data network with limited bandwidth, in which each agent is tracking objects and may have value for receiving data from other agents. The agents are self-interested and would prefer to receive data than share data. Each agent has private information about the quality of its data and can misreport this quality and degrade or otherwise decline to share its data. The problem is one of interdependent value mechanism design because the value to one agent for the broadcast of data on an object depends on the quality of the data, which is privately known to the sender. A recent two-stage mechanism due to Mezzetti (2004) can be modified to our setting. Our mechanism achieves efficient bandwidth allocation and provides incentive compatibility by conditioning payments on the realized value for data shared between agents.