A Combinatorial Auction Protocol among Versatile Experts and Amateurs
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Instantiating the contingent bids model of truthful interdependent value auctions
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Online auctions for bidders with interdependent values
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Economics of networked systems
Online mechanism design for electric vehicle charging
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
A mechanism for multiple goods and interdependent valuations
AAMAS'04 Proceedings of the 6th AAMAS international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems
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We study the problem of designing efficient auctions where bidders have interdependent values; i.e., values that depend on the signals of other agents. We consider a contingent bid model in which agents can explicitly condition the value of their bids on the bids submitted by others. In particular, we adopt a linear contingent bidding model for single minded combinatorial auctions (CAs), in which submitted bids are linear combinations of bids received from others. We extend the existing state of the art, by identifying constraints on the interesting bundles and contingency weights reported by the agents which allow the efficient second priced, fixed point bids auction to be implemented in single minded CAs. Moreover, for domains in which the required single crossing condition fails (which characterizes when efficient, IC auctions are possible), we design a two-stage mechanism in which a subset of agents ("experts") are allocated first, using their reports to allocate the remaining items to the other agents.