The Michigan Internet AuctionBot: a configurable auction server for human and software agents
AGENTS '98 Proceedings of the second international conference on Autonomous agents
Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids.
Artificial Intelligence
Designing an auction protocol under asymmetric information on nature's selection
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Sequential Auctions for the Allocation of Resources with Complementarities
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
A Combinatorial Auction for Collaborative Planning
ICMAS '00 Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on MultiAgent Systems (ICMAS-2000)
Agent-mediated electronic commerce: a survey
The Knowledge Engineering Review
Computational-Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms
IEEE Intelligent Systems
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Protocol/Mechanism Design for Cooperation/Competition
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Auction in dynamic environments: incorporating the cost caused by re-allocation
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
A strategy-proof mechanism based on multiple auction support agents
IEA/AIE'2005 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on Innovations in Applied Artificial Intelligence
Instantiating the contingent bids model of truthful interdependent value auctions
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
An adaptive attitude bidding strategy for agents in continuous double auctions
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
A new pooled buying method based on risk management
IEA/AIE'07 Proceedings of the 20th international conference on Industrial, engineering, and other applications of applied intelligent systems
Efficient interdependent value combinatorial auctions with single minded bidders
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
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Auctions have become an integral part of electronic commerce and a promising field for applying multi-agent technologies. Correctly judging the quality of auctioned items is often difficult for amateurs, in particular, in Internet auctions. However, experts can correctly judge the quality of items. In this situation, it is difficult to force experts to tell the truth and attain an efficient allocation since they have a clear advantage over amateurs; without some reward they cannot be expected to reveal their valuable information. In our previous work, we successfully develop such auction protocols under the following two cases: (1) a single-unit auction among experts and amateurs, and (2) a combinatorial auction among single-skilled experts and amateurs. In this paper we focus on versatile experts, who have interest in and expert knowledge of the qualities of several items. In the case of versatile experts, there are several problems, e.g., free riding problems, if we simply extend the previous VCG-style auction protocol. Thus, in this paper, we employ a PORF (price-oriented, rationing-free) protocol for designing our new protocol to realize a strategy-proof auction protocol for experts. In the protocol, the dominant strategy for experts is telling the truth. Also for amateurs, telling the truth is the best response when two or more experts select the dominant strategy. Furthermore, the protocol is false-name-proof.