A strategy-proof mechanism based on multiple auction support agents

  • Authors:

  • Takayuki Ito;Tokuro Matsuo;Tadachika Ozono;Toramatsu Shintani

  • Affiliations:

  • Graduate School of Engineering, Nagoya Institute of Technology, Gokiso, Showa-ku, Nagoya, Japan;Graduate School of Engineering, Nagoya Institute of Technology, Gokiso, Showa-ku, Nagoya, Japan;Graduate School of Engineering, Nagoya Institute of Technology, Gokiso, Showa-ku, Nagoya, Japan;Graduate School of Engineering, Nagoya Institute of Technology, Gokiso, Showa-ku, Nagoya, Japan

  • Venue:
  • IEA/AIE'2005 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on Innovations in Applied Artificial Intelligence
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

Agent-mediated electronic commerce has recently commanded much attention. Bidding support agents have been studied very extensively. We envision a future in which many people can trade their goods by using a bidding support agent on Internet auctions. In this paper, we formalize a situation in which people are trading their goods on Internet auctions and employing bidding support agents. Then, we prove that people who use a bidding support agent can successively win trades. Also, we prove that the situation in which every people use a bidding support agent can satisfied strategy proofness and Pareto optimality. Further, we present in the situation, unsupported bidders do not make a positive benefit.