A mechanism for multiple goods and interdependent valuations

Authors:
Rajdeep K. Dash;Alex Rogers;Nicholas R. Jennings
Affiliations:
School of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK;School of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK;School of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK
Venue:
AAMAS'04 Proceedings of the 6th AAMAS international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems
Year:
2004

Citing 6
Cited 2

Market-based control: a paradigm for distributed resource allocation

Market-based control: a paradigm for distributed resource allocation
Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions

Management Science
Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions

Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Iterative combinatorial auctions: achieving economic and computational efficiency

Iterative combinatorial auctions: achieving economic and computational efficiency
Computational-Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms

IEEE Intelligent Systems
Making markets and democracy work: a story of incentives and computing

IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence

Engineering distributed protocols for multi-agent interactions using game theory

Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Efficient interdependent value combinatorial auctions with single minded bidders

IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

This paper reports on the design of an auction mechanism for allocating multiple goods when the buyers have interdependent valuations. We cast the problem as a multi-agent system consisting of selfish, rational agents and develop an auction mechanism which is efficient, incentive compatible and individually rational. We first discuss the necessary assumptions that any mechanism developed for this scenario should satisfy so as to achieve the aforementioned properties. We then present our mechanism and show how it is a generalisation of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism.