The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Entity authentication and key distribution
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
The art of computer programming, volume 2 (3rd ed.): seminumerical algorithms
The art of computer programming, volume 2 (3rd ed.): seminumerical algorithms
Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Communications of the ACM
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Anonymous Connections and Onion Routing
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Number theoretic attacks on secure password schemes
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Routing in MANETs with Address Conflicts
MOBIQUITOUS '05 Proceedings of the The Second Annual International Conference on Mobile and Ubiquitous Systems: Networking and Services
Authenticated key exchange secure against dictionary attacks
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Anonymous password-based authenticated key exchange
INDOCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Cryptology in India
An integrated security framework for open wireless networking architecture
IEEE Wireless Communications
Anonymous password-based key exchange with low resources consumption and better user-friendliness
Security and Communication Networks
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Anonymity and specifically sender anonymity have become essential requirements for many privacy-related applications (e.g. net counselling and whistle blowing). On the other hand, anonymity may be abused for various malicious activities (e.g. redistribution of copyrighted contents and illegal drug trading). In this paper, we address both by proposing protocols for authenticated anonymous communications channels. In such channels, the client can authenticate the authentication server while the latter can only authenticate the fact that the client is one of the qualified members that are eligible to use the wireless network (e.g. WLAN hot spots, WiMAX). Our protocols are based on an efficient anonymous password-based authenticated key exchange protocol and on an anonymous IP address assignment. The proposed protocols have the following advantages: (1) they can restrict the usage of the established anonymous channels to certain fair purposes; (2) they do not involve rerouting of the packets through a chain of intermediate nodes; (3) they are available right after registration of a normal password to an authentication server as for a classical non-anonymous authentication (e.g. EAP-TTLS and PEAP) and do not require any special registration procedures that would reveal initially to the authentication server that the client belongs to a small list of users of anonymous services. However, each scheme has different features with respect to the changes required of the DHCP standard, the controlled and adaptive IP address assignment, the compatibility to authentication frameworks used for wireless networks, the scalability and the number of messages involved.