Using a formal analysis technique to identify an unbinding attack on a buyer-seller watermarking protocol

  • Authors:
  • David M. Williams;Helen Treharne;Anthony T.S. Ho;Chris Culnane

  • Affiliations:
  • University of Surrey, Guildford, United Kingdom;University of Surrey, Guildford, United Kingdom;University of Surrey, Guildford, United Kingdom;University of Surrey, Guildford, United Kingdom

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 10th ACM workshop on Multimedia and security
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

In this paper we provide a novel approach to the analysis of buyer-seller watermarking protocols by tailoring an existing formal technique that has not previously been used in this context. We accurately represent a buyer-seller watermarking protocol as proposed by Ibrahim et al. [6] by constructing a model using the process algebra CSP. By describing our model in this manner and utilising the tool support associated with CSP we are able to conduct a thorough analysis of all the possible behaviour in the protocol. Through formal analysis we have discovered an unbinding attack on the protocol. In this paper we also highlight other weaknesses that exist in the protocol and propose verifiable solutions to correct these weaknesses.