Gradually Convertible Undeniable Signatures

  • Authors:
  • Laila Aimani;Damien Vergnaud

  • Affiliations:
  • b-it COSEC - Bonn/Aachen International Center for Information Technology, Computer Security Group, Dahlmannstr. 2, D-53113 Bonn, Germany;b-it COSEC - Bonn/Aachen International Center for Information Technology, Computer Security Group, Dahlmannstr. 2, D-53113 Bonn, Germany

  • Venue:
  • ACNS '07 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

In 1990, Boyar, Chaum, Damgård and Pedersen introduced convertible undeniable signatureswhich limit the self-authenticating property of digital signatures but can be converted by the signer to ordinary signatures. Michels, Petersen and Horster presented, in 1996, an attack on the Elgamal-based seminal scheme of Boyar et al.and proposed a repaired version without formal security analysis. In this paper, we modify their protocol so that it becomes a generic one and it provides an advanced feature which permits the signer to universally convert achronouslyall signatures pertaining to a specific time period. We supply a formal security treatment of the modified scheme: we prove, in the generic group model, that the protocol is existentially unforgeable and anonymous under chosen message attacks, assuming new assumptions (though reasonable) on the underlying hash function.