Certificateless undeniable signature scheme
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Gradually Convertible Undeniable Signatures
ACNS '07 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Universally Composable Undeniable Signature
ICALP '08 Proceedings of the 35th international colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, Part II
New RSA-Based (Selectively) Convertible Undeniable Signature Schemes
AFRICACRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Cryptology in Africa: Progress in Cryptology
Provably secure convertible undeniable signatures with unambiguity
SCN'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Security and cryptography for networks
A framework for constructing convertible undeniable signatures
ProvSec'10 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Provable security
Pairing-based nominative signatures with selective and universal convertibility
Inscrypt'09 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information security and cryptology
New approach for selectively convertible undeniable signature schemes
ASIACRYPT'06 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
An efficient compiler from Σ-protocol to 2-move deniable zero-knowledge
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part II
Certificateless undeniable signatures from bilinear maps
Information Sciences: an International Journal
| Hi-index | 754.84 |
In this paper, a new kind of adversarial goal called forge-and-impersonate in undeniable signature schemes is introduced. Note that forgeability does not necessarily imply impersonation ability. The security of the full-domain hash (FDH) variant of Chaum's undeniable signature scheme is then classified according to three dimensions, the goal of adversaries, the attacks, and the zero-knowledge (ZK) level of confirmation and disavowal protocols. Each security is then related to some well-known computational problem. In particular, the security of the FDH variant of Chaum's scheme with noninteractive zero-knowledge (NIZK) protocol confirmation and disavowal protocols is proven to be equivalent to the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem, as opposed to the gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) problem as claimed by Okamoto and Pointcheval.