A Provably Secure One-Pass Two-Party Key Establishment Protocol

Authors:
K. Chalkias;S. T. Halkidis;D. Hristu-Varsakelis;G. Stephanides;A. Alexiadis
Affiliations:
Computational Systems and Software Engineering Laboratory, Department of Applied Informatics, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece;Computational Systems and Software Engineering Laboratory, Department of Applied Informatics, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece;Computational Systems and Software Engineering Laboratory, Department of Applied Informatics, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece;Computational Systems and Software Engineering Laboratory, Department of Applied Informatics, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece;Computational Systems and Software Engineering Laboratory, Department of Applied Informatics, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece
Venue:
Information Security and Cryptology
Year:
2007

Citing 14
Cited 0

Entity authentication and key distribution

CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
An unknown key-share attack on the MQV key agreement protocol

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
An Efficient Protocol for Authenticated Key Agreement

Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Authenticated Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocols

SAC '98 Proceedings of the Selected Areas in Cryptography
Systematic Design of Two-Party Authentication Protocols

CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Analysis of Key-Exchange Protocols and Their Use for Building Secure Channels

EUROCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Key Agreement Protocols and Their Security Analysis

Proceedings of the 6th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding
An Identity-Based Signature from Gap Diffie-Hellman Groups

PKC '03 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
A One Round Protocol for Tripartite Diffie-Hellman

ANTS-IV Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Algorithmic Number Theory
Short Signatures from the Weil Pairing

Journal of Cryptology
A new two-party identity-based authenticated key agreement

CT-RSA'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Topics in Cryptology
HMQV: a high-performance secure diffie-hellman protocol

CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Batch verifications with ID-Based signatures

ICISC'04 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
Security analysis of KEA authenticated key exchange protocol

PKC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Theory and Practice of Public-Key Cryptography

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

For two parties to communicate securely over an insecure channel, they must be able to authenticate one another and establish a common session key. We propose a new secure one-pass authenticated key establishment protocol which is well suited to one-way communication channels. The protocol is examined using an extension of the Bellare-Rogaway model proposed by Blake-Wilson et. al., and is shown to be provably secure, in the sense that defeating the protocol is equivalent to solving a CDH problem. We compare our protocol to existing approaches, in terms of security and efficiency. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the only one-pass protocol that resists general key-compromise impersonation attacks, and avoids certain vulnerabilities to loss of information attacks found in other protocols of its class.