An unknown key-share attack on the MQV key agreement protocol

  • Authors:
  • Burton S. Kaliski, Jr.

  • Affiliations:
  • RSA Laboratories

  • Venue:
  • ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
  • Year:
  • 2001

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Abstract

The MQV key agreement protocol, a technique included in recent standards, is shown in its basic form to be vulnerable to an unknown key-share attack. Although the attack's practical impact on security is minimal---a key confirmation step easily prevents it---the attack is noteworthy in the principles it illustrates about protocol design. First, minor "e;efficiency improvements"e; can significantly alter the security properties of a protocol. Second, protocol analysis must consider potential interactions with all parties, not just those that are normally online. Finally, attacks must be assessed in terms of system requirements, not just in isolation.