Cryptanalysis of a provably secure cross-realm client-to-client password-authenticated key agreement protocol of CANS '09

  • Authors:
  • Wei-Chuen Yau;Raphael C. -W. Phan;Bok-Min Goi;Swee-Huay Heng

  • Affiliations:
  • Faculty of Engineering, Multimedia University, Cyberjaya, Malaysia;Electronic, Electrical & Systems Engineering, Loughborough University, Leicestershire, UK;Faculty of Engineering & Science, Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman, Malaysia;Faculty of Information Science & Technology, Multimedia University, Melaka, Malaysia

  • Venue:
  • CANS'11 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Cryptology and Network Security
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

In this paper, we cryptanalyze the recent smart card based client-to-client password-authenticated key agreement (C2C-PAKA-SC) protocol for cross-realm settings proposed at CANS '09. While client-to-client password-authenticated key exchange (C2C-PAKE) protocols exist in literature, what is interesting about this one is that it is the only such protocol claimed to offer security against password compromise impersonation without depending on public-key cryptography, and is one of the few C2C-PAKE protocols with provable security that has not been cryptanalyzed. We present three impersonation attacks on this protocol; the first two are easier to mount than the designer-considered password compromise impersonation. Our results are the first known cryptanalysis results on C2C-PAKA-SC.