Password-Based authenticated key exchange in the three-party setting

  • Authors:
  • Michel Abdalla;Pierre-Alain Fouque;David Pointcheval

  • Affiliations:
  • Departement d'Informatique, École normale supérieure, Paris Cedex 05, France;Departement d'Informatique, École normale supérieure, Paris Cedex 05, France;Departement d'Informatique, École normale supérieure, Paris Cedex 05, France

  • Venue:
  • PKC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

Password-based authenticated key exchange are protocols which are designed to be secure even when the secret key or password shared between two users is drawn from a small set of values. Due to the low entropy of passwords, such protocols are always subject to on-line guessing attacks. In these attacks, the adversary may succeed with non-negligible probability by guessing the password shared between two users during its on-line attempt to impersonate one of these users. The main goal of password-based authenticated key exchange protocols is to restrict the adversary to this case only. In this paper, we consider password-based authenticated key exchange in the three-party scenario, in which the users trying to establish a secret do not share a password between themselves but only with a trusted server. Towards our goal, we recall some of the existing security notions for password-based authenticated key exchange protocols and introduce new ones that are more suitable to the case of generic constructions. We then present a natural generic construction of a three-party protocol, based on any two-party authenticated key exchange protocol, and prove its security without making use of the Random Oracle model. To the best of our knowledge, the new protocol is the first provably-secure password-based protocol in the three-party setting.