Efficient and provably secure generic construction of three-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocols

  • Authors:
  • Weijia Wang;Lei Hu

  • Affiliations:
  • Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Sciences, State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Beijing, China;Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Sciences, State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Beijing, China

  • Venue:
  • INDOCRYPT'06 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptology in India
  • Year:
  • 2006

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

Three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (3-party PAKE) protocols make two communication parties establish a shared session key with the help of a trusted server, with which each of the two parties shares a predetermined password. Recently, with the first formal treatment for 3-party PAKE protocols addressed by Abdalla et al., the security of such protocols has received much attention from cryptographic protocol researchers. In this paper, we consider the security of 3-party PAKE protocols against undetectable on-line dictionary attacks which are serious and covert threats for the protocals. We examine two 3-party PAKE schemes proposed recently by Abdalla et al. and reveal their common weakness in resisting undetectable on-line dictionary attacks. With reviewing the formal model for 3-party PAKE protocols of Abdalla et al. and enhancing it by adding the authentication security notion for the treatment of undetectable attacks, we then present an efficient generic construction for 3-party PAKE protocols, and prove it enjoys both the semantic security and the authentication security.