Provably secure three-party password authenticated key exchange protocol in the standard model

  • Authors:
  • Jun-Han Yang;Tian-Jie Cao

  • Affiliations:
  • School of Computer, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou, Jiangsu 221116, China;School of Computer, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou, Jiangsu 221116, China and State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Graduate School of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, B ...

  • Venue:
  • Journal of Systems and Software
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

Three-party password authenticated key exchange protocol is a very practical mechanism to establish secure session key through authenticating each other with the help of a trusted server. Most three-party password authenticated key exchange protocols only guarantee security in the random oracle model. However, a random oracle based cryptographic construction may be insecure when the oracle is replaced by real function. Moreover, some previous unknown attacks appear with the advance of the adversary capability. Therefore, a suitable standard model which can imitate a wider variety of attack scenarios for 3PAKE protocol is needed. Aim at resisting dictionary attack, unknown key-share attack and password-compromise impersonation attack, an expanded standard model for 3PAKE protocol is given. Meanwhile, through applying ElGamal encryption scheme and pseudorandom function, a specific three-party password authenticated key exchange protocol is proposed. The security of the proposed protocol is proven in the new standard model. The result shows that the present protocol has stronger security by comparing with other existing protocols, which covers the following security properties: (1) semantic security, (2) key privacy, (3) client-to-server authentication, (4) mutual authentication, (5) resistance to various known attacks, and (6) forward security.