Diffie-Hellman key distribution extended to group communication
CCS '96 Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Provably authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Group Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Secure against Dictionary Attacks
ASIACRYPT '02 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
A secure and scalable group key exchange system
Information Processing Letters
A Robust Multi-Party Key Agreement Protocol Resistant to Malicious Participants
The Computer Journal
EC2C-PAKA: An efficient client-to-client password-authenticated key agreement
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Authenticated key exchange secure against dictionary attacks
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Password-Based authenticated key exchange in the three-party setting
PKC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography
Password-Based group key exchange in a constant number of rounds
PKC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Theory and Practice of Public-Key Cryptography
New directions in cryptography
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Key agreement in ad hoc networks
Computer Communications
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This paper considers the issue on authenticated group key agreement protocol among n users broadcasting communication over an insecure public network. Many authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocols have been proposed to meet the challenges. However, existing protocols are either limited by the use of public key infrastructure or by their scalability, requiring O(n) rounds. To overcome these disadvantages, we propose an efficient password-based group key agreement protocol resistant to the dictionary attacks by adding password-authentication services to a non-authenticated multi-party key agreement protocol proposed by Horng. The proposed protocol is very efficient since it only requires constant rounds to agree upon a session key, and each user broadcasts a constant number of messages and only requires four exponentiations. Under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, we will show the proposed protocol is provably secure in both the ideal-cipher model and the random-oracle model.