A Robust Multi-Party Key Agreement Protocol Resistant to Malicious Participants

Authors:
Yuh-Min Tseng
Affiliations:
Department of Mathematics, National Changhua University of Education, Jin-De Campus, Chang-Hua, Taiwan 500, R.O.C.
Venue:
The Computer Journal
Year:
2005

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Abstract

By its very nature, a non-authenticated multi-party key agreement protocol cannot provide participant and message authentication, so it must rely on an authenticated network channel. This paper presents the inability of two famous multi-party key agreement protocols to withstand malicious participant attacks, even though their protocols are based on the authenticated network channel. This attack involves a malicious participant disrupting the multi-party key agreement among honest participants. In this case, other honest participants do not correctly agree on a common key. Obviously, the malicious participant cannot obtain the common key either, and the communication confidentiality among participants is not breached. However, in some emergency situations or applications, a multi-party key agreement protocol design that is resistant to malicious participants is useful. Therefore, in this paper, a non-authenticated multi-party key agreement protocol resistant to malicious participants is proposed. The proposed robust protocol requires constant rounds to establish a common key. Each participant broadcasts a constant number of messages. Under the assumption of the Decision Diffie--Hellman problem and the random oracle model, we will show that the proposed protocol is provably secure against passive adversaries and malicious participants.