Password-based tripartite key exchange protocol with forward secrecy

  • Authors:
  • Guomin Li;Dake He;Wei Guo

  • Affiliations:
  • Laboratory of Information Security and National Computing Grid, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu, PR of China;Laboratory of Information Security and National Computing Grid, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu, PR of China;Laboratory of Information Security and National Computing Grid, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu, PR of China

  • Venue:
  • RSKT'08 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Rough sets and knowledge technology
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

A tripartite authenticated key agreement protocol is designed for three entities to communicate securely over an open network particularly with a shared key. Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) allows the participants to share a session key using a human memorable password only. In this paper, A password-based authenticated tripartite key exchange protocol(3-PAKE) is presented in the standard model. The security of the protocol is reduced to theDecisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem, and the protocol provides not only the properties of forward secrecy, but also resistance against known key attacks. The proposed protocol is more efficient than the similar protocols in terms of both communication and computation.