A new key exchange protocol based on MQV assuming public computations

  • Authors:
  • Sébastien Kunz-Jacques;David Pointcheval

  • Affiliations:
  • École normale supérieure, Paris, France;École normale supérieure, Paris, France

  • Venue:
  • SCN'06 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

Designing authenticated key exchange algorithms is a problem well understood in cryptography: there are established security models, and proposals proved secure in these models. However, models currently used assume that a honest entity involved in a key exchange is trusted as a whole. In many practical contexts, the entity is divided in an authentication device storing a private key and having low computing power, and a computing device, that performs part of the computations required by protocol runs. The computing device might be a PC connected to the Internet, and the authenticating device a smart card. In that case as well in many others, a compromise of the computing device is to be expected. We therefore propose a variant of the MQV and HMQV key exchange protocols secure in that context, unlike the original protocols. The security claim is supported by a proof in a model derived from the Canetti-Krawczyk one, which takes into account more general rogue behaviours of the computing device.