Security Analysis of the PACE Key-Agreement Protocol

  • Authors:
  • Jens Bender;Marc Fischlin;Dennis Kügler

  • Affiliations:
  • Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), Germany;Darmstadt University of Technology, Germany;Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), Germany

  • Venue:
  • ISC '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Information Security
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

We analyze the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) protocol for authenticated key agreement, recently proposed by the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) for the deployment in machine readable travel documents. We show that the PACE protocol is secure in the real-or-random sense of Abdalla, Fouque and Pointcheval, under a number-theoretic assumption related to the Diffie-Hellman problem and assuming random oracles and ideal ciphers.