Authentication and authenticated key exchanges
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Intercepting mobile communications: the insecurity of 802.11
Proceedings of the 7th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
An unknown key-share attack on the MQV key agreement protocol
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Dynamic Group Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange under Standard Assumptions
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Unknown Key-Share Attacks on the Station-to-Station (STS) Protocol
PKC '99 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography
Analyzing the energy consumption of security protocols
Proceedings of the 2003 international symposium on Low power electronics and design
Overview of IEEE 802.16 Security
IEEE Security and Privacy
Modeling insider attacks on group key-exchange protocols
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Secure and Efficient Group Key Agreements for Cluster Based Networks
Transactions on Computational Science IV
Errors in computational complexity proofs for protocols
ASIACRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
SCN'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security in Communication Networks
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A group key exchange (GKE) protocol is designed to allow a group of parties communicating over a public network to establish a common secret key called a session key. As group-oriented applications gain popularity over the Internet, a number of GKE protocols have been suggested to provide those applications with a secure multicast channel. Among the many protocols is the GKE protocol presented by Dutta and Dowling for mobile ad hoc networks. In this paper, we are concerned with the security of the Dutta-Dowling protocol. Their protocol carries a proof of security in the standard adversarial model which captures unknown key-share attacks. But unlike the claim of provable security, the Dutta-Dowling protocol fails to achieve unknown key-share resilience. We here reveal this security vulnerability of the protocol and show how to address it.