The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
SODA '04 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Popular matchings in the capacitated house allocation problem
ESA'06 Proceedings of the 14th conference on Annual European Symposium - Volume 14
LATIN'08 Proceedings of the 8th Latin American conference on Theoretical informatics
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
Pareto optimality in house allocation problems
ISAAC'04 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
ICALP '09 Proceedings of the 36th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming: Part I
Popular Matchings: Structure and Algorithms
COCOON '09 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Conference on Computing and Combinatorics
Popular Matchings with Variable Job Capacities
ISAAC '09 Proceedings of the 20th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation
Popular matchings with variable item copies
Theoretical Computer Science
Theoretical Computer Science
Social welfare in one-sided matching markets without money
APPROX'11/RANDOM'11 Proceedings of the 14th international workshop and 15th international conference on Approximation, randomization, and combinatorial optimization: algorithms and techniques
Popular matchings: structure and algorithms
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
Popular matchings in the marriage and roommates problems
CIAC'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Algorithms and Complexity
Welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences
Proceedings of the 5th conference on Innovations in theoretical computer science
Hi-index | 0.00 |
We investigate the following problem: given a set of jobs and a set of people with preferences over the jobs, what is the optimal way of matching people to jobs? Here we consider the notion of popularity. A matching Mis popular if there is no matching M茂戮驴 such that more people prefer M茂戮驴 to Mthan the other way around. Determining whether a given instance admits a popular matching and, if so, finding one, was studied in [2]. If there is no popular matching, a reasonable substitute is a matching whose unpopularityis bounded. We consider two measures of unpopularity - unpopularity factordenoted by u(M) and unpopularity margindenoted by g(M). McCutchen recently showed that computing a matching Mwith the minimum value of u(M) or g(M) is NP-hard, and that if Gdoes not admit a popular matching, then we have u(M) 茂戮驴 2 for all matchings Min G.Here we show that a matching Mthat achieves u(M) = 2 can be computed in $O(m\sqrt{n})$ time (where mis the number of edges in Gand nis the number of nodes) provided a certain graph Hadmits a matching that matches all people. We also describe a sequence of graphs: H= H2, H3,...,Hksuch that if Hkadmits a matching that matches all people, then we can compute in $O(km\sqrt{n})$ time a matching Msuch that u(M) ≤ k茂戮驴 1 and $g(M) \le n(1-\frac{2}{k})$. Simulation results suggest that our algorithm finds a matching with low unpopularity.