A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
RSA Speedup with Residue Number System Immune against Hardware Fault Cryptanalysis
ICISC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference Seoul on Information Security and Cryptology
A Study on the Proposed Korean Digital Signature Algorithm
ASIACRYPT '98 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
The Montgomery Powering Ladder
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Fault Attacks on RSA with CRT: Concrete Results and Practical Countermeasures
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
A new CRT-RSA algorithm secure against bellcore attacks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
How can we overcome both side channel analysis and fault attacks on RSA-CRT?
FDTC '07 Proceedings of the Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
Securing RSA against Fault Analysis by Double Addition Chain Exponentiation
CT-RSA '09 Proceedings of the The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA Conference 2009 on Topics in Cryptology
A new CRT-RSA algorithm resistant to powerful fault attacks
WESS '10 Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Embedded Systems Security
An efficient CRT-RSA algorithm secure against power and fault attacks
Journal of Systems and Software
Modulus fault attacks against RSA-CRT signatures
CHES'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Memory-efficient fault countermeasures
CARDIS'11 Proceedings of the 10th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
Attacking RSA---CRT signatures with faults on montgomery multiplication
CHES'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Proceedings of ACM SIGPLAN on Program Protection and Reverse Engineering Workshop 2014
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Fault attacks as introduced by Bellcore in 1996 are still a major threat toward cryptographic products supporting RSA signatures. Most often on embedded devices, the public exponent is unknown, turning resistance to fault attacks into an intricate problem. Over the past few years, several techniques for secure implementations have been published, all of which suffering from inadequacy with the constraints faced by embedded platforms. In this paper, we introduce a novel countermeasure mechanism against fault attacks in RSA signature generation. In the restricted context of security devices where execution time, memory consumption, personalization management and code size are strong constraints, our countermeasure is simply applicable with a low computational complexity. Our method extends to all cryptosystems based on modular exponentiation.