Security analysis of the full-round DDO-64 block cipher

  • Authors:
  • Changhoon Lee;Jongsung Kim;Seokhie Hong;Jaechul Sung;Sangjin Lee

  • Affiliations:
  • Center for Information Security Technologies (CIST), Korea University, Anam Dong, Sungbuk Gu, 136-701 Seoul, Republic of Korea;Center for Information Security Technologies (CIST), Korea University, Anam Dong, Sungbuk Gu, 136-701 Seoul, Republic of Korea;Center for Information Security Technologies (CIST), Korea University, Anam Dong, Sungbuk Gu, 136-701 Seoul, Republic of Korea;Department of Mathematics, University of Seoul, 90 Cheonnong Dong, Dongdaemun Gu, Seoul, Republic of Korea;Center for Information Security Technologies (CIST), Korea University, Anam Dong, Sungbuk Gu, 136-701 Seoul, Republic of Korea

  • Venue:
  • Journal of Systems and Software
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

DDO-64 is a 64-bit Feistel-like block cipher based on data-dependent operations (DDOs). It is composed of 8 rounds and uses a 128-bit key. There are two versions of DDO-64, named DDO-64V"1 and DDO-64V"2, according to the key schedule. They were designed under an attempt for improving the security and performance of DDP-based ciphers. In this paper, however, we show that like most of the existing DDP-based ciphers, DDO-64V"1 and DDO-64V"2 are also vulnerable to related-key attacks. The attack on DDO-64V"1 requires 2^3^5^.^5 related-key chosen plaintexts and 2^6^3^.^5 encryptions while the attack on DDO-64V"2 only needs 8 related-key chosen plaintexts and 2^3^1 encryptions; our attacks are both mainly due to their simple key schedules and structural weaknesses. These works are the first known cryptanalytic results on DDO-64V"1 and DDO-64V"2 so far.