Rights Amplification in Master-Keyed Mechanical Locks
IEEE Security and Privacy
Multiple View Geometry in Computer Vision
Multiple View Geometry in Computer Vision
Security analysis of a cryptographically-enabled RFID device
SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
Smudge attacks on smartphone touch screens
WOOT'10 Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on Offensive technologies
Heat of the moment: characterizing the efficacy of thermal camera-based attacks
WOOT'11 Proceedings of the 5th USENIX conference on Offensive technologies
Progress and challenges in intelligent vehicle area networks
Communications of the ACM
Graphical passwords: Learning from the first twelve years
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
| Hi-index | 0.02 |
The access control provided by a physical lock is based on the assumption that the information content of the corresponding key is private --- that duplication should require either possession of the key or a priori knowledge of how it was cut. However, the ever-increasing capabilities and prevalence of digital imaging technologies present a fundamental challenge to this privacy assumption. Using modest imaging equipment and standard computer vision algorithms, we demonstrate the effectiveness of physical key teleduplication --- extracting a key's complete and precise bitting code at a distance via optical decoding and then cutting precise duplicates. We describe our prototype system, Sneakey, and evaluate its effectiveness, in both laboratory and real-world settings, using the most popular residential key types in the U.S.