Smudge attacks on smartphone touch screens

  • Authors:
  • Adam J. Aviv;Katherine Gibson;Evan Mossop;Matt Blaze;Jonathan M. Smith

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania;Department of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania;Department of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania;Department of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania;Department of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania

  • Venue:
  • WOOT'10 Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on Offensive technologies
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

Touch screens are an increasingly common feature on personal computing devices, especially smartphones, where size and user interface advantages accrue from consolidating multiple hardware components (keyboard, number pad, etc.) into a single software definable user interface. Oily residues, or smudges, on the touch screen surface, are one side effect of touches from which frequently used patterns such as a graphical password might be inferred. In this paper we examine the feasibility of such smudge attacks on touch screens for smartphones, and focus our analysis on the Android password pattern. We first investigate the conditions (e.g., lighting and camera orientation) under which smudges are easily extracted. In the vast majority of settings, partial or complete patterns are easily retrieved. We also emulate usage situations that interfere with pattern identification, and show that pattern smudges continue to be recognizable. Finally, we provide a preliminary analysis of applying the information learned in a smudge attack to guessing an Android password pattern.