Supply chain coordination by revenue-sharing contract with fuzzy demand

Authors:
Junyan Wang;Ruiqing Zhao;Wansheng Tang
Affiliations:
(Correspd. Tel.: +86 22 27404446/ Fax: +86 22 27404241/ E-mail: junyanwang@tju.edu.cn) Institute of System Engineering, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China;Institute of System Engineering, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China;Institute of System Engineering, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
Venue:
Journal of Intelligent & Fuzzy Systems: Applications in Engineering and Technology
Year:
2008

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Abstract

In this paper, we study revenue-sharing contract in a supply chain with fuzzy demand. Under such a contract, a retailer pays a supplier a wholesale price for each unit purchased, plus a percentage of the revenue generated by the retailer that is determined by retailer's purchase quantity and price. We address the contract under two kinds of fuzzy demands which depend on the retailer's selling price based on game theory. The effectiveness of the revenue-sharing contract under fuzzy demands is proved.