Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects
Management Science
Introducing Flexible Quantity Contracts into Distributed SoC and Embedded System Design Processes
Proceedings of the conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe - Volume 2
Quantity flexibility contracts under Bayesian updating
Computers and Operations Research
The survey on supply chain coordination with contracts
ICEC '05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Electronic commerce
Multi-period dynamic supply contracts with cancellation
Computers and Operations Research - Articles presented at the conference on routing and location (CORAL)
Coordinating a two-level supply chain with delay in payments and profit sharing
Computers and Industrial Engineering - Special issue: Sustainability and globalization: Selected papers from the 32 nd ICC&IE
Simple Relational Contracts to Motivate Capacity Investment: Price Only vs. Price and Quantity
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Supply chain coordination by revenue-sharing contract with fuzzy demand
Journal of Intelligent & Fuzzy Systems: Applications in Engineering and Technology
Altruistic behaviour in a two-echelon supply chain with unmatched proportional feedback controllers
International Journal of Intelligent Systems Technologies and Applications
A framework for evaluation of coordination by contracts: A case of two-level supply chains
Computers and Industrial Engineering
Distributed search for supply chain coordination
Computers in Industry
Multi-period dynamic supply contracts with cancellation
Computers and Operations Research - Articles presented at the conference on routing and location (CORAL)
Supply chain coordination with retail competition
CCDC'09 Proceedings of the 21st annual international conference on Chinese control and decision conference
Disruption management of supply chain under demand and production cost disruptions
CCDC'09 Proceedings of the 21st annual international conference on Chinese control and decision conference
Single-vendor multi-buyer discount pricing model under stochastic demand environment
Computers and Industrial Engineering
Achieving a Long-Term Service Target with Periodic Demand Signals: A Newsvendor Framework
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Analysis on the effects of stock sharing on supply chain
Computers and Industrial Engineering
Sourcing Flexibility, Spot Trading, and Procurement Contract Structure
Operations Research
Disruption management for a dominant retailer with constant demand-stimulating service cost
Computers and Industrial Engineering
A new revenue sharing mechanism for coordinating multi-echelon supply chains
Operations Research Letters
Strategic alliance via co-opetition: Supply chain partnership with a competitor
Decision Support Systems
Mitigating bankruptcy propagation through contractual incentive schemes
Decision Support Systems
A study on coordination of capacity allocation for different types of contractual retailers
Decision Support Systems
Modeling supply contracts in semiconductor supply chains
Proceedings of the Winter Simulation Conference
Joint quantity flexibility for multiple products in a decentralized supply chain
Computers and Industrial Engineering
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
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Consider a supply chain consisting of two independent agents, a supplier (e.g., a manufacturer) and its customer (e.g., a retailer), the latter in turn serving an uncertain market demand. To reconcile manufacturing/procurement time lags with a need for timely response to the market, such supply chains often must commit resources to production quantities based on forecasted rather than realized demand. The customer typically provides a planning forecast of its intended purchase, which does not entail commitment. Benefiting from overproduction while not bearing the immediate costs, the customer has incentive to initially overforecast before eventually purchasing a lesser quantity. The supplier must in turn anticipate such behavior in its production quantity decision. This individually rational behavior results in an inefficient supply chain. This paper models the incentives of the two parties, identifying causes of inefficiency and suggesting remedies. Particular attention is given to the Quantity Flexibility (QF) contract, which couples the customer's commitment to purchase no less than a certain percentage below the forecast with the supplier's guarantee to deliver up to a certain percentage above. Under certain conditions, this method can allocate the costs of market demand uncertainty so as to lead the individually motivated supplier and customer to the systemwide optimal outcome. We characterize the implications of QF contracts for the behavior and performance of both parties, and the supply chain as a whole.