Managing buyer-seller system cooperation with quantity discount considerations
Computers and Operations Research
Channel coordination and quantity discounts
Management Science
Managing a distribution channel under asymmetric information with performance requirements
Management Science - Special issue: Frontier research on information systems and economics
The Quantity Flexibility Contract and Supplier-Customer Incentives
Management Science
Channel Dynamics Under Price and Service Competition
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
A General Equilibrium Model for Industries with Price and Service Competition
Operations Research
Channel Coordination in the Presence of a Dominant Retailer
Marketing Science
Computers and Industrial Engineering - Special issue: Sustainability and globalization: Selected papers from the 32 nd ICC&IE
Coordinating a two-level supply chain with delay in payments and profit sharing
Computers and Industrial Engineering - Special issue: Sustainability and globalization: Selected papers from the 32 nd ICC&IE
Strategic Manufacturer Response to a Dominant Retailer
Marketing Science
Co-op advertising and pricing models in manufacturer-retailer supply chains
Computers and Industrial Engineering
Achieving better coordination through revenue sharing and bargaining in a two-stage supply chain
Computers and Industrial Engineering
Disruption management in the airline industry-Concepts, models and methods
Computers and Operations Research
Computers and Industrial Engineering
Computers and Industrial Engineering
Price and leadtime competition, and coordination for make-to-order supply chains
Computers and Industrial Engineering
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In this paper, we consider coordination model of a one-manufacturer and multi-retailer supply chain with a dominant retailer's sales promotion opportunity and possible demand disruption. An appropriate contractual scheme can be used to fully coordinate the supply chain even if the demand disruption occurs. In our study, we also analyze how the demand disruption affects the coordination mechanism. When the demand is disrupted, the manufacturer only needs to adjust the maximum variable wholesale price and the subsidy rate under the linear quantity discount scheme. For each case of the demand disruption, we find that the higher the market share of the dominant retailer, the lower its average wholesale price will be. Meanwhile, the higher service cost leads to the higher subsidy rate provided by the manufacturer. The optimal wholesale/retail price, order quantity and subsidy rate can be greatly influenced by the demand disruption. If the disrupted amount of demand is sufficiently small, however, the manufacturer needs to take some special measures to prevent the retailers from deviating the order quantity of the original plan. To demonstrate these findings, we illustrate our propositions by numerical examples.