Idea Generation, Creativity, and Incentives
Marketing Science
Benefits of Channel Discord in the Sale of Durable Goods
Marketing Science
Research NoteThe Benefits of Personalized Pricing in a Channel
Marketing Science
Idea Generation, Creativity, and Incentives
Marketing Science
On the coordination of dynamic marketing channels and two-part tariffs
Automatica (Journal of IFAC)
Strategic Assortment Reduction by a Dominant Retailer
Marketing Science
Supplier contract selection decision with retailing market dominant
CCDC'09 Proceedings of the 21st annual international conference on Chinese control and decision conference
In-Store Media and Distribution Channel Coordination
Marketing Science
Buyer Uncertainty and Two-Part Pricing: Theory and Applications
Management Science
The Length of Product Line in Distribution Channels
Marketing Science
Disruption management for a dominant retailer with constant demand-stimulating service cost
Computers and Industrial Engineering
Manufacturer-retailer supply chain coordination: A bi-level programming approach
Advances in Engineering Software
Exclusive Channels and Revenue Sharing in a Complementary Goods Market
Marketing Science
How to Price Discriminate When Tariff Size Matters
Marketing Science
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The retail trade today is increasingly dominated by large, centrally managed "power retailers." In this paper, we develop a channel model in the presence of a dominant retailer to examine how a manufacturer can best coordinate such a channel.We show that such a channel can be coordinated to the benefit of the manufacturer through either quantity discounts or a menu of two-part tariffs. Both pricing mechanisms allow the manufacturer to charge different effective prices and extract different surpluses from the two different types of retailers, even though they both have the appearance of being "fair." However, quantity discounts and two-part tariffs are not equally efficient from the manufacturer's perspective as a channel coordination mechanism. Therefore, the manufacturer must judiciously select its channel coordination mechanism.Our analysis also sheds light on the role of "street money" in channel coordination. We show that such a practice can arise from a manufacturer's effort to mete out minimum incentives to engage the dominant retailer in channel coordination. From this perspective, we derive testable implications with regard to the practice of street money.