Achieving better coordination through revenue sharing and bargaining in a two-stage supply chain

Authors:
Jing Hou;Amy Z. Zeng;Lindu Zhao
Affiliations:
Institute of Systems Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing, Jiangsu 210096, China;Department of Management, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, MA 01609, USA;Institute of Systems Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing, Jiangsu 210096, China
Venue:
Computers and Industrial Engineering
Year:
2009

Citing 1
Cited 6

Coordinating a two-level supply chain with delay in payments and profit sharing

Computers and Industrial Engineering - Special issue: Sustainability and globalization: Selected papers from the 32 nd ICC&IE

Ordering, wholesale pricing and lead-time decisions in a three-stage supply chain under demand uncertainty

Computers and Industrial Engineering
Supply chain network equilibrium with revenue sharing contract under demand disruptions

International Journal of Automation and Computing
Disruption management for a dominant retailer with constant demand-stimulating service cost

Computers and Industrial Engineering
Coordinating orders in a two echelon supply chain with controllable lead time and ordering cost using the credit period

Computers and Industrial Engineering
Deterministic approach to the fairest revenue-sharing coefficient in logistics service supply chain under the stochastic demand condition

Computers and Industrial Engineering
Price and leadtime competition, and coordination for make-to-order supply chains

Computers and Industrial Engineering

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

Coordination is essential for improving supply chain wide performance. In this paper, we focus on a two-stage supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer, and in the chain, the retailer's profit is sensitive to the supplier's lead time, which is influenced by the supplier's target inventory level. The coordination between the two parties is achieved through revenue sharing and bargaining in such a way that their respective profit is better than that resulted from a decentralized optimization. The key contract parameter, the revenue-sharing fraction, along with the maximum amount of monetary bargain space, is obtained under explicit and implicit information, respectively. Numerical illustrations of the contracts for various scenarios are also given.