Channel coordination and quantity discounts
Management Science
The Quantity Flexibility Contract and Supplier-Customer Incentives
Management Science
Agent-Based Modeling vs. Equation-Based Modeling: A Case Study and Users' Guide
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Multi-Agent Systems and Agent-Based Simulation
Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects
Management Science
Pre-IPO Operational and Financial Decisions
Management Science
On supply chain cash flow risks
Decision Support Systems
Confidentiality and Information Sharing in Supply Chain Coordination
Management Science
Reducing the probability of bankruptcy through supply chain coordination
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part C: Applications and Reviews
Operational causes of bankruptcy propagation in supply chain
Decision Support Systems
Using multi-agent simulation and learning to design new businessprocesses
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and Humans
The effects of a trust mechanism on a dynamic supply chain network
Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
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With the increasing interdependence among supply chain members on material, information and capital, interactions and decisions characterized by operational parameters are important causes of bankruptcy propagation in supply chain. This paper investigates the methods for mitigating bankruptcy propagation through supply chain coordination. Based on a two-stage supply chain network that consists of multiple upstream manufacturers and multiple downstream retailers, the effectiveness of some typical contractual incentive schemes, including revenue sharing, price discount and quantity flexibility contracts, in mitigating bankruptcy propagation among supply chain members is examined. Through agent-based simulation experiments, it has been revealed that: 1) the three typical supply chain contracts with properly designed contract parameters are effective in mitigating bankruptcy propagation, but their effectiveness depends on operational parameters of the supply chain; 2) horizontal competition among retailers is an important factor in determining the effectiveness of these contracts; 3) revenue sharing contract turns out to be more effective in mitigating bankruptcy propagation than the other two contracts. By comparing the optimal contract parameters with and without considering bankruptcy risks, it has also been found that, a set of contract parameters that can maximize the profit of the supply chain may increase the occurrence of bankruptcy in supply chain, leading to the phenomenon of a risk-profit tradeoff.