Backup agreements in fashion buying—the value of upstream flexibility
Management Science
The Quantity Flexibility Contract and Supplier-Customer Incentives
Management Science
Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control, Two Volume Set
Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control, Two Volume Set
Quantity Flexibility Contracts and Supply Chain Performance
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Multistage Inventory Management with Expediting
Operations Research
Adjustment Strategies for a Fixed Delivery Contract
Operations Research
Coordination and Flexibility in Supply Contracts with Options
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Supplier-buyer models for the bargaining process over a long-term replenishment contract
Computers and Industrial Engineering - Special issue: Logistics and supply chain management
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This paper considers a class of multi-period dynamic supply contracts in which a buyer orders a product from a supplier in each period and the supplier allows the buyer to cancel a portion of an outstanding order with penalty during a planning horizon. We assume that both the buyer and the supplier have common knowledge. We first characterize the buyer's ordering and canceling policy that minimizes his expected cost during the planning horizon. We also characterize the supplier's optimal production policy under a very mild assumption on the costs of production and storage. Based on this structure, we then use simulation to show how the supplier chooses cancellation costs that minimize her expected cost during the planning horizon. Our simulation shows that both the buyer and the supplier would benefit from the contract.