Attacking the Kad network

  • Authors:
  • Peng Wang;James Tyra;Eric Chan-Tin;Tyson Malchow;Denis Foo Kune;Nicholas Hopper;Yongdae Kim

  • Affiliations:
  • University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN;University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN;University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN;University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN;University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN;University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN;University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security and privacy in communication netowrks
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

The Kad network, an implementation of the Kademlia DHT protocol, supports the popular eDonkey peer-to-peer file sharing network and has over 1 million concurrent nodes. We describe several attacks that exploit critical design weaknesses in Kad to allow an attacker with modest resources to cause a significant fraction of all searches to fail. We measure the cost and effectiveness of these attacks against a set of 16,000 nodes connected to the operational Kad network. We also measure the cost of previously proposed, generic DHT attacks against the Kad network and find that our attacks are much more cost effective. Finally, we introduce and evaluate simple mechanisms to significantly increase the cost of these attacks.