Kademlia: A Peer-to-Peer Information System Based on the XOR Metric
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Secure routing for structured peer-to-peer overlay networks
OSDI '02 Proceedings of the 5th symposium on Operating systems design and implementationCopyright restrictions prevent ACM from being able to make the PDFs for this conference available for downloading
ARES '06 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security
Defending against eclipse attacks on overlay networks
Proceedings of the 11th workshop on ACM SIGOPS European workshop
SybilGuard: defending against sybil attacks via social networks
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Exploiting KAD: possible uses and misuses
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security and privacy in communication netowrks
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In this paper, we assess the protection mechanisms entered into recent clients to fight against the Sybil attack in KAD, a widely deployed Distributed Hash Table. We study three main mechanisms: a protection against flooding through packet tracking, an IP address limitation and a verification of identities. We evaluate their efficiency by designing and adapting an attack for several KAD clients with different levels of protection. Our results show that the new security rules mitigate the Sybil attacks previously launched. However, we prove that it is still possible to control a small part of the network despite the new inserted defenses with a distributed eclipse attack and limited resources.