Random Visitor: Defense against Identity Attacks in P2P Networks
IEICE - Transactions on Information and Systems
Evaluation of Sybil Attacks Protection Schemes in KAD
AIMS '09 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Autonomous Infrastructure, Management and Security: Scalability of Networks and Services
Detection and Defense of Identity Attacks in P2P Network
ISICA '09 Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Advances in Computation and Intelligence
Researches on secure proximity distance defending attack of finger table based on chord
ICACT'09 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Advanced Communication Technology - Volume 3
A certificateless-based Key distribution scheme with multi-KGCs in P2P networks
WiCOM'09 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Wireless communications, networking and mobile computing
Random visitor: a defense against identity attacks in P2P overlay networks
WISA'06 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information security applications: PartI
Collaborative anomaly detection for structured P2P networks
GLOBECOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Global telecommunications
Veracity: practical secure network coordinates via vote-based agreements
USENIX'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on USENIX Annual technical conference
A survey of DHT security techniques
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Comet: an active distributed key-value store
OSDI'10 Proceedings of the 9th USENIX conference on Operating systems design and implementation
Increasing the resilience of critical SCADA systems using peer-to-peer overlays
ISARCS'10 Proceedings of the First international conference on Architecting Critical Systems
GAUR: a method to detect Sybil groups in peer-to-peer overlays
International Journal of Grid and Utility Computing
SybilControl: practical sybil defense with computational puzzles
Proceedings of the seventh ACM workshop on Scalable trusted computing
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The robustness of Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks, in particular of DHT-based overlay networks, suffers significantly when a Sybil attack is performed. We tackle the issue of Sybil attacks from two sides. First, we clarify, analyze, and classify the P2P identifier assignment process. By clearly separating network participants from network nodes, two challenges of P2P networks under a Sybil attack become obvious: i) stability over time, and ii) identity differentiation. Second, as a starting point for a quantitative analysis of time-stability of P2P networks under Sybil attacks and under some assumptions with respect to identity differentiation, we propose an identity registration procedure called self-registration that makes use of the inherent distribution mechanisms of a P2P network.