Chord: A scalable peer-to-peer lookup service for internet applications
Proceedings of the 2001 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
A scalable content-addressable network
Proceedings of the 2001 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Security Considerations for Peer-to-Peer Distributed Hash Tables
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Pastry: Scalable, Decentralized Object Location, and Routing for Large-Scale Peer-to-Peer Systems
Middleware '01 Proceedings of the IFIP/ACM International Conference on Distributed Systems Platforms Heidelberg
Tapestry: An Infrastructure for Fault-tolerant Wide-area Location and
Tapestry: An Infrastructure for Fault-tolerant Wide-area Location and
Vulnerabilities and Security Threats in Structured Overlay Networks: A Quantitative Analysis
ACSAC '04 Proceedings of the 20th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
PChord: Improvement on Chord to Achieve Better Routing Efficiency by Exploiting Proximity
ICDCSW '05 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Mobility in Peer-to-Peer Systems - Volume 08
ARES '06 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Structured Peer-to-peer networks overlay provide a substrate for the contribution of scalability, load balance, decentralization, and availability. However, new nodes are confronted with hijacking attacks on the Peer-to-Peer overlay with attackers. This paper proposes a model that the malicious nodes can not modify messages over the links and therefore can not control identifiers of correct nodes. However, malicious nodes could send fault messages to befool the correct nodes. Peer-to-Peer routing and location algorithm Chord is analyzed. Secure proximity distance that is security policy to defense the finger table attack is proposed. Analysis shows that the impact of attack is relative to the scale of overlay, the proportion of malicious nodes belonging to each attacker, the secure proximity distance, and the number of attackers. We conclude that the proportion of malicious nodes in the finger table will be higher than the proportion of malicious nodes in the overlay because of finger table attack.