A security model for dynamic adaptive traffic masking
NSPW '97 Proceedings of the 1997 workshop on New security paradigms
Communications of the ACM
Secure dynamic adaptive traffic masking
Proceedings of the 1999 workshop on New security paradigms
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
SNDSS '96 Proceedings of the 1996 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (SNDSS '96)
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
From DC-Nets to pMIXes: Multiple Variants for Anonymous Communications
NCA '06 Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Breaking four mix-related schemes based on universal re-encryption
ISC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Information Security
Anonymous communication with on-line and off-line onion encoding
SOFSEM'05 Proceedings of the 31st international conference on Theory and Practice of Computer Science
Some remarks on universal re-encryption and a novel practical anonymous tunnel
ICCNMC'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Networking and Mobile Computing
Onions based on universal re-encryption – anonymous communication immune against repetitive attack
WISA'04 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information Security Applications
A formal treatment of onion routing
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Timing analysis in low-latency mix networks: attacks and defenses
ESORICS'06 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Klein bottle routing: an alternative to onion routing and mix network
ICISC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
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This paper proposes a return route information encryption scheme for onion-based e-mail systems and mix-nets. Our scheme has the following two properties. (1) It allows any node on the message route to send reply messages to the sender of the message. This property is necessary for sending error replies. (2) It allows the replying node to send multiple reply messages from one piece of return route information. This property is necessary when responding with large amounts of data using multiple messages. In order to construct a return route information scheme, we must consider a new type of attack, namely the replace attack. A malicious node obtains information about the route by replacing secret information that only the node can read. This paper describes the new type of attack and shows that previous schemes are vulnerable to it. Our scheme prevents replace attacks. In addition, we show that by slightly modifying our scheme malicious nodes cannot distinguish whether a message is a forward message or a reply message, thus improving the security of the routing scheme.