Data networks
Bargaining theory with applications
Bargaining theory with applications
Congestion-dependent pricing of network services
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Fair end-to-end window-based congestion control
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
A game theoretic framework for bandwidth allocation and pricing in broadband networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Stability and performance analysis of networks supporting elastic services
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Impact of fairness on Internet performance
Proceedings of the 2001 ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Fixed point approximations for TCP behavior in an AQM network
Proceedings of the 2001 ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Bandwidth sharing: objectives and algorithms
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Measurement-Based Usage Charges in Comminucations Networks
Operations Research
Online pricing for bandwidth provisioning in multi-class networks
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Scalable fluid models and simulations for large-scale IP networks
ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation (TOMACS)
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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Data stream providers face a hard decision to satisfy the requirements of their subscribers. Each user has a minimum and a maximum required bandwidth. The server should be able to decide which requests can be satisfied and how much bandwidth will be allocated to each. We present a theoretical framework in a distributed mechanism for fair bandwidth allocation on a network with various bottleneck links. In our model, a user is guaranteed a minimum bandwidth and charged a price for the bandwidth allocated. A utility function is defined over the allocated bandwidth for a specific maximum requested bandwidth. We then present a non-cooperative game with social welfare function to resolve users' conflicting bandwidth capacity requests at bottleneck links. We also show that our proposed game-theoretic solution guarantees fair bandwidth allocation as defined in our residual capacity fairness. In order to guarantee the minimum bandwidth requirement, we integrate an admission control mechanism in our solution. However, global optimal admission conditions are not easy to implement for large networks. Therefore, we propose a distributed admission scheme. As a result, the paper presents fair and practical distributed algorithms for bandwidth allocation and admission control in enterprise networks. Our simulation and evaluation study shows that the distributed approach is sufficiently close to the global optimal solution.