Discrete Applied Mathematics - ARIDAM IV and V
Space/time trade-offs in hash coding with allowable errors
Communications of the ACM
Efficient tracing of failed nodes in sensor networks
WSNA '02 Proceedings of the 1st ACM international workshop on Wireless sensor networks and applications
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Secure Aggregation for Wireless Networks
SAINT-W '03 Proceedings of the 2003 Symposium on Applications and the Internet Workshops (SAINT'03 Workshops)
SIA: secure information aggregation in sensor networks
Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Embedded networked sensor systems
Resilient aggregation in sensor networks
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
On the Distribution and Revocation of Cryptographic Keys in Sensor Networks
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
SDAP: a secure hop-by-Hop data aggregation protocol for sensor networks
Proceedings of the 7th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
Secure hierarchical in-network aggregation in sensor networks
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
An efficient integrity-preserving scheme for hierarchical sensor aggregation
WiSec '08 Proceedings of the first ACM conference on Wireless network security
Efficient and Robust Secure Aggregation for Sensor Networks
NPSEC '07 Proceedings of the 2007 3rd IEEE Workshop on Secure Network Protocols
Secure Distributed Data Aggregation
Foundations and Trends in Databases
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Current approaches to handling adversary attacks against data aggregation in sensor networks either aim exclusively at the detection of aggregate data corruption or provide rather inefficient ways to identify the nodes captured by an adversary. In contrast, we propose a distributed algorithm for efficient identification of captured nodes over a constant number of rounds, for an arbitrary number of captured nodes. We formulate our problem as a combinatorial group testing problem and show that this formulation leads not only to efficient identification of captured nodes but also to a precise cost-based characterization of when in-network aggregation retains its assumed benefits in a sensor network operating under persistent attacks.