Security without identification: transaction systems to make big brother obsolete
Communications of the ACM
Zero knowledge proofs of identity
STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Rethinking Public Key Infrastructures and Digital Certificates: Building in Privacy
Rethinking Public Key Infrastructures and Digital Certificates: Building in Privacy
Design and implementation of the idemix anonymous credential system
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Digital Identity Management based on Digital Credentials
Informatik bewegt: Informatik 2002 - 32. Jahrestagung der Gesellschaft für Informatik e.v. (GI)
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
EUROCRYPT'91 Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
SP'04 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Security Protocols
Pseudonymity in the light of evidence-based trust
SP'04 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Security Protocols
Ring signatures: stronger definitions, and constructions without random oracles
TCC'06 Proceedings of the Third conference on Theory of Cryptography
Private location-based information retrieval through user collaboration
Computer Communications
Optimized query forgery for private information retrieval
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
A privacy-protecting architecture for collaborative filtering via forgery and suppression of ratings
DPM'11 Proceedings of the 6th international conference, and 4th international conference on Data Privacy Management and Autonomous Spontaneus Security
Optimal tag suppression for privacy protection in the semantic Web
Data & Knowledge Engineering
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This paper deals with privacy-preserving (pseudonymized) access to a service resource. In such a scenario, two opposite needs seem to emerge. On one side, the service provider may want to control, in first place, the user accessing its resources, i.e., without being forced to delegate the issuing of access permissions to third parties to meet privacy requirements. On the other side, it should be technically possible to trace back the real identity of a user upon dishonest behavior, and of course, this must be necessary accomplished by an external authority distinct from the provider itself. The framework described in this paper aims at coping with these two opposite needs. This is accomplished through (i) a distributed third-party-based infrastructure devised to assign and manage pseudonym certificates, decoupled from (ii) a two-party procedure, devised to bind an authorization permission to a pseudonym certificate with no third-party involvement. The latter procedure is based on a novel blind signature approach which allows the provider to blindly verify, at service subscription time, that the user possesses the private key of the still undisclosed pseudonym certificate, thus avoiding transferability of the authorization permission.