Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed Human Intelligence
Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed Human Intelligence
Enchanted Looms: Conscious Networks in Brains and Computers
Enchanted Looms: Conscious Networks in Brains and Computers
Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again
Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again
How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics
How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics
Virtually Conquering Fear of Flying
IEEE Computer Graphics and Applications
Minds and Machines
VRAIS '96 Proceedings of the 1996 Virtual Reality Annual International Symposium (VRAIS 96)
Real wrongs in virtual communities
Ethics and Information Technology
Sketchpad: a man-machine graphical communication system
AFIPS '63 (Spring) Proceedings of the May 21-23, 1963, spring joint computer conference
Floridi's Philosophy of Information and Information Ethics: Current Perspectives, Future Directions
The Information Society - The Philosophy of Information, its Nature, and Future Developments
Hi-index | 0.00 |
My aim in this paper is to go some way towards showing that the maintenance of hard and fast dichotomies, like those between mind and body, and the real and the virtual, is untenable, and that technological advance cannot occur with being cognisant of its reciprocal ethical implications. In their place I will present a softer enactivist ontology through which I examine the nature of our engagement with technology in general and with virtual realities in particular. This softer ontology is one to which I will commit Kant, and from which, I will show, certain critical moral and emotional consequences arise. It is my contention that Kant's logical subject is necessarily embedded in the world and that Kant, himself, would be content with this view as an expression of his inspired response to the "scandal to philosophy驴 that the existence of things outside us驴 must be accepted merely on faith" [Bxl]. In keeping with his arguments for the a priori framing of intuition, the a priori structuring of experience through the spontaneous application of the categories, the synthesis of the experiential manifold, and the necessity of a unity of apperception, I will present an enactivist account of agency in the world, and argue that it is our embodied and embedded kinaesthetic engagement in our world which makes possible the syntheses of apprehension, reproduction and recognition, and which, in turn, make possible the activity of the reproductive or creative imagination.